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RESTRICTED

THE RISE OF SOVIET POWER
A lecture delivered by

Dr. P. E. Mosely

at the Naval War College
28 August, 1950

Captain Felt, members of the Naval War College and guests:
I should point out at the very beginning of this phase of
your work on the Russian problem that there are no "Russian
experts". There are only varying degrees of ignorance about Rus
sia, and I'm sure you will discover that I have varying degrees of
ignorance about Russia, especially after we get into our discussion.
What I want to do today is to point out some of the things
which we ought to watch in Russian development in order to es
timate both the capacities and the intentions of the Soviet leader
ship, and what they can get from their people and their regime
in the way of power.
This brings us first to the question of the nature of the
historic development of the last 30 or 40 years in Russia, and
here I want to point out that Russia has not had just one revolution.
It has had at least four revolutions, and they are not yet ended.
That is why this is an open-ended problem and one that is so
baffling to try to get at, quite aside from the obstacles which the.
Soviet government places in the way of the objective study of
any problem by its own people and the objective study of Russia
by people outside.
Doctor Mosely is Professor of International Relations at the Russian
Institute, Columbia University.
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I want to take a quick look at Russia as it was at the begin

ning of this ce�tury and discuss so�e �f the main processes that

have been going on in Russian society, and then see how some of
those problems shape up today;

Pre-World-War-I Russia was already th_e most populous

state in Europe, and I think that we should bear that in mind

when we consider Russia's population today. If it had not been for
the losses suffered by Russia during the First World War, during
the Civil War and intervention, which were much more destruc

tive than the World War, then the period of famine, then the col

lectivization, (it must have eliminated around 5,000,000 people),

then .the Second World War which probably had direct losses of

12,000,000 people, and finally losses due to decline in birthrate
during the war, (perhaps 5,000,000 more), if it were not for those
great blood-lettings, which have occured at least three tjmes in a

little over thirty years, we would face a Soviet Union which would
have around 275,000,000 people rather than one which probably
has around 210,000,000 today. I just want to mention in passing
that even the size of Russia's population is a State secret, and

estimates made abroad vary all ways from 195,000,000 as of today,
up to 220,000,000. So there is a gap of 25,000,000 people which
have not been fully accounted for. That is the kind of problem
that you are going to face and all of us who work on Russia face
in trying to find out the elementary facts about the country.

Russia in 1941 had great resources which were only be

ginning to be developed, and l want to mention, also in passing,
(you'll hear much more about that later from my friend Doctor

Shimkin) that, on the whole, they are badly located. Many of
their mineral resources are relatively inaccessible and it requires
a provision of the most elementary techniques of civilization in

order to get at many of those resources.
14
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Then the agricultural resources are poorly distributed. Al
hough
Russia is still a half-agrarian country and in 1914 was
t
more than 80% agricultural according to the occupations of its

people, Russia actually has a usable and useful agricultural area
sliglrtly smaller than that of the United States, although Russia
has a total area larger than that of the United States and Canada
combined. Even these agricultural resources are not well located
in terms of climate. The richest areas are in the west. They nar
row in width as one moves eastward, but as the winds from the
central part of Asia come from the Volga, crossing the Volga,
they bring periodic famines. 1947, for example, was a very bad
year in Russian agriculture, but famine seems to have been averted

by government steps.

Then all this area east of the Urals looks very green on
the map. Actually the area from the Urals eastward and to the
south is too dry, northward too wet and cold to be useful.
In 1914, Russia was engaged in an agrarian revolution..
In fact, there were two revolutions going on simultaneously. One
of these was the struggle of the peasants for control of the land,
a pattern which is very old in Europe, and other countries too.
As political awareness grows, social demands grow. The peasants
have striven to take the land for themselves and to throw off the

control of the landowners, and this struggle has gone on inter

mittently in Russia for many decades, often leading to consid
erable violence. In the 1950 revolution for example, there were
very widespread agrarian outbursts of violence. The gradual trans

fer of the land from the landowners to the peasants had been going
on rapidly in the decades before the revolution, and even if there
had not been a violent political revolution most of the land of
Russia would have been in the hands of the peasants by 1925.
They would have had it in their hands much the same as the French
peasa:n� has it, mainly in small holdings.
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Now this agrarian revolution had been fostered by the
government after 1905. It wanted to build up a class of land-own
ing peasantry, feeling that that would cure the peasantry of rev
olutionary dealings and lead them to support the government. At
the same time there was this continuing resentment of the peas
antry for the past abuses of the land-owning system and a desire
for revenge. I think if we look at the agrarian revolution which
occured in 1917 quite spontaneously as soon as the Czarist gov
ernment was removed, we must recognize that it was more an
emotional than a rational outburst. It was a response to the
abuses of the peasantry under serfdom. Serfdom had only been
abolished officially after 1861, and there were many people alive
who had lived under it. It takes many generations to overcome
the effects of serfdom with its interference with the lives of the
peasantry, its control over them, the helplessness of the peasant
in the face of the land-owner, backed by the authority of the state.
We must remember that under serfdom a landlord could order
any of his peasants exiled to Siberia, - a very severe punishment.
He could interfere with his marriage, could sell the peasant indi
vidually or his family. In fact, except for the question of color,
(because there was no difference of color), Russian serfdom was
in many ways more severe than slavery in this country prior to
our war between the states. And all that left an accumulation
of class hatred. I think we cannot understand what happened
in 1917 except in terms of emotional desire for revenge. On a
rational pattern of thinking, the peasants should have just gone
along taking over the land, becoming independent landholders.
One other factor in the agrarian situation was very im
portant in 1917, and has continued to be of importance, and that
is the system of joint holding practiced by the Great Russians.
This system of communal ownership or joint ownership was not
practiced in the Ukraine, and it was not practiced in Belo-Russia

16
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(White Russia) or in the Baltic states, or in the Caucasus or

Central Asia. It was a typical land-holding system of the Great

Russians, the people inhabiting the Republic of Great Russia
of today within the Soviet Union.

Now under this system, the peasants did not own the land

individually but merely had the right to use it as joint owners

along with the other members of the village. Under a system of

periodic partition, the land was redistributed from time to time

and the peasant could therefore never be sure of holding indef

initely the land which he then cultivated or, even less, of passing
it on to his children.

This system of the Mir, or communal land-holding, was

in my opinion the root of the population problem prior to 1914.

Under the communal system, the peasant who limited the number

of his children would get less land. So, in a sense, there was a

competition among the peasants to see who could have the most

children because that established the number of working hands

in the family, or the number of mouths to be fed. That was the
basis of division of the land, in the periodic redistribution.

Under the communal system of land-holding, the peasant

worked his own land and enjoyed the product of it. It was not

at all like the collective farm system of today, but it did mean

that the individual Russian peasant had very little conception

of private property. He was interested in getting all the land for
all the peasants rather than getting more land for himself.

The peasants were not too enthusiastic about the govern°

ment's plan for distributing the land to individual peasants. In

1917, when the government's pressure was removed, the peasants

simply turned around, drove out the landlords, reestablished the

system of commun�I ownership where it had been broken down
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in part, and carried out a communal revolution of their own.
This revolution committed the peasant against· private ownership

of land. That -meant that he was not able to struggle against
the Soviet regime once it was established in power, because he

did not have the clear idea of individual ownership as it had devel

oped throughout most of the rest of Europe. And the problem of
the relation of the peasant to the land was further complicated

by the pressure of population against the supply of land.

The population pressure which developed in Russia after

1860 was expressed in the doubling of the population every 25

years. In the United States we were doubling our population too,

but we were doing it in large part through immigration of adults,
able and ready to work, and in many cases already highly trained.
Many of our best engineers came from Denmark, Norway, Ger

many, France, and so forth. In the Russian system, however,

most of this increased population remained on the land with the
result that the size of the individual holdings declined. The pres
sure merely to raise enough food to feed the peasant's own family

grew more intense. The land was impoverished because the bal
ance between livestock and cereal crops was broken down in many
parts of the country. The growth of industry, while rapid, was

too slow to absorb the surplus. So it backed up in the villages
and left a reservoir of social resentment which complicated the

solution of all the other problems.

In 1914 Russia had plenty of population, plenty of resour
ces, although not well distributed, but it lacked capital, and it
lacked industrial. techniques. In spite of these handicaps, industry
was developing rapidly. The rate of growth of Russian industry

prior to 1914 was greater than at the corresponding period of
American industrialization and in many ways was greater than
that achieved by the Soviet regime in its industrialization. But

18
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the industrialization wa� at the first stage when the new con

<,litions of work weigh upon the peasants up-rooted from the vil
lages. It was a plilriod like the early industrial revolution in

England, with its severe discipline, its repression of trade unions,

and its accumulation of capital by the owners in order to finance
this rapid expansion. It was not at all like the more "benevolent"

and more mature type of capitalism with which we are familiar

in our own generation and the last two generations in this country;

Russia then had a rapidly growing industry, but it had

certain great handicaps. First of all, it had to be forced by the
government. In Russia, the government accounted for more than

half of the growth of industry, either directly or indirectly. Some
great factories were built directly by the government and operated
by it. Many more were built with government subsidies, or guar
antee of loans on money borrowed abroad. In other cases con

tracts were given over a period of years in order to stimulate the
growth of industry. In addition the government, of course, op
erated most of the railroad system and all of this great develop
ment had to be paid for out of the peasant standard of living in
spite of the large-scale borrowings from abroad, especially from
France. This meant that industry had not settled down, and the
workers had not achieved a stable position in society. There was
widespread discontent among the workers, and it was through
that discontent that the initial nucleus of the Communist regime

was created. In the revolution of 1917 this nucleus emerged vic
torious because it was able to control the cities and to win either
the support or the neutrality of the peasants and in that way to
establish control iri the country.

One other factor, which proved to be important in the
political strategy of Bolshevism, was the high degree of concen
tration of industry.. This concentration was natural, because cap-
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ital was scarce, because techniques had to be imported, and because
the development was in such a large part, especially .in heavy in
dustry, under the guidance of the government. The tendency was
to develop large enterprises. Actually, in 1913 Russia had more

· factories employing 1,000 men or more than the United States
although the total American industrialization was at least six
times more than the total Russian- industrialization at that time.

Aside from the agrarian revolution and the industrial re

volution, there was a third revolution which was taking place

the political revolution.

Briefly, there were main forces.; there

was the force that supported the autocracy, which believed in

strong and paternalistic rule from above and no discussion below,
and this concept remained strong. It dominated the bureaucracy
which ran the country until 1917, and led it into sharp conflict
with the other two political forces.
There was a second political force represented by liberalism,
by the ambition to develop along the lines of western democracy.
This element was influential, but it was not strong numerically.
It had not been able to integrate most of the peasants and workers
into support of .its program. It rested on a very thin layer of the
population which was well informed about the western countries.
Many educated -Russians travelled abroad. In many ways educated
people found it difficult to communicate with the ordinary worker
and peasant. In a sense, they were in the same predicament as
many Chinese intellectuals who had studied abroad for a great
many years and .who were unable to lead their own people on re
turning to China. In Russia there was something of the same
problem of social and cultural distance between th.e intelligentsia,
the educated group, with its western sympathies, and the ordinary
people. This separation was marked also by a difference in dress,
in manner, in way of life. The ordinary Russian is not a very
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clean person; the intelligentsia prided itself on cleanliness. The

intelligentsia wore western clothes, the peasants and many of the
workers still wore traditional peasant dress. There was a differ

ence in manner, in speech, in the way they thought, even in vocab

ulary. And the liberals were not able really to consolidate the

headstart which they had in the beginning of the revolution in

1917.

The third element was the revolutionary force, those who

rejected gradualism, who were just as much opposed to parlia

mentary and western democracy as were the supporters of the
old regime, who wanted, in some form or another, some kind of
dictatorship which would lead the country, not doing what the
people wanted, but what the leaders "knew" was good for them.

, These revolutionary groups were not large. They were of course,

the extreme wing of the intelligentsia and often received sympathy
and support because they were leading a bitter fight against the
old regime. Many of them led an heroic underground life, carrying

on a guerrilla warfare against the police authorities of the state.
Many of them suffered execution, exile to Siberia, loss of health

and even life. They were professional revolutionaries, a type
with which we are quite unfamiliar in this country. It was a special

profession, living under false papers, bound by very tight bonds

of solidarity within a small group, dreaming about the future and
believing they had the recipe for changing every aspect of Russian
life.

Among the groups of revolutionaries, there was a small
group, an extreme wing of what was then called the "Social Dem
ocratic Party", which became the Communist Party in 1918. This
party emerged in control- during the chaotic period following the
breakdown of the old regime. In a sense Russia in 1917 was caught
in mid-stream. There were promising developments toward dem-
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ocracy of the type that we know. There had been a system of county
self-government established gradually from the 1860's on, which
had played a very great part in improving health, education and
social services in the country. After 1906, there was a parliamen
tary body, the State Duma, which, however, was elected under
rather a restricted suffrage and which was unable to dominate
the government. It was engaged in a struggle from 1906 to 1917
to secure control over the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy was al
ways engaged in fighting off these attempts, and neither side
was strong enough to win. The czarist regime, having become rel

atively mild and almost liberal in its last years, did not wish to
suppress these institutions of representative assembly of the Duma
or the Zemstvo. On the other hand, they were not willing or not
weak enough to surrender the power which they had, especially
the power over the police and the armed forces.

If Russia had· not been defeated in the war of 1914-1917,
perhaps there would have been a gradual evolution. Perhaps the
power of the Duma would have been strengthened. There might
have been a gradual shift of control, and with the completion of

the agrarian reform from above, mentioned earlier, a catastrophic
revolution might have been avoided.
All of these contradictions were tied · up together with the
impact of the war. While the Russian army fought very bravely
and suffered very severely from 1914 to 1917, it did not have a po,
Utical understanding - of the war. There was discipline, yes, but

when that broke down there was not a common political ambition
or platform to which you could appeal to secure voluntary obedience
when the compelled obedience had disappeared in the revolution.
In a s'ense, the Czarist regime fell or disintegrated rather

than being overthrown. Then there was a struggle between the
liberal and democratic forces and the revolutionary ones. The
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liberal elements were unable to end the war without breaking with
the allies. They wanted to cooperate closely with France, England

and the United States. Therefore they refused to consider with

drawing from the war in order to make a separate peace. On the

other hand, they were not able to create a new army and find a new
basis for political loyalty among the masses of soldiers and sailors
who made up the armed forces. So they were caught. The shift,

the revolution, came when the country was in mid-stream. They

were beginning to develop habits of political discussion, party life,

relatively free elections, and yet the new regime, the Communist

regime, was the one which reverted to paternalism, to rule from

above, in an autocratic manner.

As the leader of the revolution, Lenin, said in 1917, just

before seizure of power, when he was asked

by many of the

doubting members of his own party, "Well, how can we keep power,
we are only a little group, how can we rule Russia?" Lenin said,

"Well, if the Czar could rule Russia with the help of a hundred

thousand land owners serving as voluntary police chiefs, and rule
it

against the aspirations of the bulk of the people,

certainly we can

rule it with three hundred thousand members of the Communist
party and rule it in accordance with the desires of the people." So,

in a sense what happened in 1917 was that the slow progress to-.
wards the democracy of the west was scrapped, not without a con

siderable fight, it is true. A new revolutionary paternalism took

the place of the old autocratic paternalism and established a new

authority which could hand down orders from above. The bulk of
the people could find some comfort in obeying them whether they

could fully understand them or not.

Now, in addition to these three principal revolutions, agrar

ian, industrial, political, there were three minor revolutions going
on which I can group together under the heading of the cultural
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revolution. In the cultural field, there was a great outreaching,

certainly by the ordinary Russian people, for greater educational

and other opportunities. In 1913 Russia was still more than 60%
illiterate, but a large part of that was found among the' older gen
eration or among the village women, who were not accustomed to
learning to read and write and did not see any need for it. The per

centage of literacy in the younger generation was already much

higher, and by the process of change from one generation to another,

and in accordance with the plans for education which were under

way at that time, Russia would have been a completely literate
country probably around 1925 to 1930. In fact, literacy· would

have been achieved by these programs earlier than it was by the
revolution, in spite of the Soviet claim that elimination of iUiteracy
has been one of the chief merits of the new regime.

Now, learning to read and write is not too much in itself.
It is a question of what they are going to learn to read and write,

and in what language. Was the cultural content to be a repetition

of what had gone on in the old regime? Or was it to be reaching out
for reforms, for political democracy, or social democracy? Here
was part of the cultural problem: if you taught all the young peas
ants to read and write, they would probably get to reading revo
lutionary literature in a very short time, and their political loy
alties would shift to either: the liberals or the revolutionaries. So
here was a first-class problem. What would you give them to read?

The second problem was-in what language? Russia, in 1914
as today, was inhabited up to 50% by Great Russians or by the Rus
sians in the proper sense, among other numerous peoples. For in
stance, the Ukrainians number somewhere between 30 and 40
millions. And other peoples, such as the Poles, the Byelorussians,
the Baltic peoples, the peoples of the Caucasus,-Armenians, Geor

gians, Azerbaijanian Turks,-and the peoples of Central Asia. The
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Russian nationality was dominant. Until 1914 it far out-shadowed
the other Orthodox Slav elements, - the Byelorussians and Ukrain
ians, - while the Poles remained unassimilated by the Russians.
On the other hand, the Mohammed peoples, - and we must remem
ber that Russia,_ is one of the largest Mohammedan countries, were left pretty much to themselves, provided they obeyed the
orders of the local officials.
If this cultural revolution took place in the Russian language
and through its· use would there be recognition in the other lan
guages? Would there be recognition of the non-Russian languages
and cultures, with the very real possibility that these peoples would
then develop a real consciousness of their own languages, then of
their literatures, then of their historic traditions, following the pat
tern of national survival as it has developed time and again through
out Europe. The old regime emphasized the Russian language and
placed severe handicaps upon the development of the languages
and cultures of the non-Russian peoples.
In the ease of Poland, one of the most extreme cases, most
of the secondary education, except for the Polish language and lit
erature, had to be taught in Russian. So the Poles who had never
heard Russian at home had to learn to write in schools and to write
examinations and carry out class discussions in a foreign language.
The University of Warsaw was almost completely Russian and was
staffed by Russians. Ukrainian received no recognition at all. It
was only after 1905 that little books of songs and poems could be
published in Ukrainian.
So there was a strong tendency to emphasize Russian, to
insist upon assimilation to the Russian culture and outlook, as a
basis for becoming a first-class citizen in the Russian empire. How
ever, except in the case of the Poles and the Finns, these separate
nationalities had not created any political problem for Russia prior
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to 1914. Just because the repression was so severe, it was effective.

If you are severe enough you can be effective but. it may lead to

a terrific rebound. After 1917, however, the Russian Empire broke

. up, and many separate states were formed. Estonia, Latvia, Fin
. land and Lithuania became independent.

Poland, of course, be

came independent. Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan all became

independent and were independent for several years. The most

numerous non-Russian people, the Ukrainians, also formed a sep

arate regime and, for some months were able to assert a separate

existence. Actually aside from the Poles and the Finns, with their

strong traditions, national separatism arose out of the Communist

revolution and was a reaction of these outlying peoples with dif
ferent cultural and religious traditions against the Soviet regime.

As long as they had expected a democratic revolution with freedom

of all kinds, there had been no really mass movement for separa
tion except among Finns and Poles.

After the Soviet government had recognized in theory the

right of every nationality to determine its own future, it turned

around a:µd reconquered as many as it could of these nationalities
which had formerly been in the Russian empire. Between 1918

and 1925 it succeeded in conquering the Ukraine, half of Belo

Russia, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Far Eastern Republic
centered on Chita and Vladivostok. It was forced to acknowledge

the separation of Poland, Finland and the Baltic States. In the

case of the Baltic countries naval power was decisive in bringing

power to bear to prevent Central Russia, seriously weakened at

that time, from persisting in its efforts to reconquer the eastern

shores of the Baltic.

The nationality problem, then, and the national revolution,

- the question of the future relations between the Russians and

the other peoples,-· was a potential rather than an immediate
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problem in 1914. It flared up prematurely, one might say, to an
intense peak in 1917 because of the Communist revolution. It
has become a much more difficult problem since that time.
Finally, the religious problem was a very real part of the
cultural problem in 1914. The Orthodox Church, as a state church,
had been very closely connected with the Tsarist government.
It did not have the high degree of independent loyalty which
churches may develop under a separation of church and state.
It had weaknesses within its own organization. There were dis
reputable characters like Rasputin-who was not an official of
the church, contrary to what the movies always show-who was
able to exert a strong influence over the church administration
and to build up a clique of his own to control it. There was a
strong undercurrent of religious unrest in Russia. Russia had
never gone through the Renaissance of 16th Century W1,stern
Europe, had never gone through the Protestant or Catholic re
formation with its great tightening of spiritual and moral dis
cipline whch occured in Central or Western Europe. It was a
body for the carrying out of ritual, in very large part. The role of
the Russian church in teaching the people was slight. As late as
1903 Pobedonostsev, the civilian head of the administration of
the church, appointed by the Czar, sent out a circular, advising
the priests not to preach because they were likely to make a great
many mistakes, since they were not very well educated and were
more likely to lead their flock into heresy than to enlighten them!
So there was a kind of spiritual and moral unrest too, in
Russia. The Russian intellectuals were asking themselves "the
eternal questions", staying up all night to discuss them. What
was their duty? Should they become revolutionaries? Should they
work within the existing society? What could they do to help the
people?
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In 1914, Russia did not have any plans for dominating the

world, contrary to many theories that are now put about which

maintain that Russia has always tried to spread over the entire

world. In 1914 Russia was one of six great powers in Europe,

one of four great powers in the Far Eastern balance of power, and

it operated through a system of alliances. In order to be strong
_
it had a direct alliance with France and a potential one with Eng

land. It operated as one power factor within a balance of power
which sometimes operated as a concert of Europe.

There was within Russian thought a Messianic strain, a

feeling that Russia had a great message to bring to the world,

but that was hardly ever carried into the field of practical politics

in those days, as it is today. In fact the basic trend in Russia
among the educated people was one of admiration for the West,

of liking for its freedom and its development, and a strong desire

to imitate it. Many of them perhaps had their eyes fixed so much

on the West that they did not study the peculiarities of Russia

closely enough and were not able to control the political forces

which swept across it in 1917.

Since 1917, and its establishment through a seizure of

power, the Soviet regime .has gone through several great crises.
The first· of these was the political and military struggle for sur

vival in war and intervention. The intervention was a very half

hearted affair. If carried out on a full-scale it could have been

successful but the problems it would have created in the home

lands of the intervening powers would have been very great too.

In any case, the interests of England and France were more in

weakening Russia, and the Soviet regime seemed likely to be a

weak regime.

Certainly it was very weak for the first fifteen

years of its control. There was not really a strong determination,
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except among individuals like Churchill, to overthrow the Soviet
regime by outside intervention.
Within the country, the Soviet leaders were skillful in
either winning the support of · most of the workers and a large
part of the peasantry or of neutralizing those who were not on
their side, thus reducing the opposition to relatively small and
divided groups. One of the techniques which they developed at
that time, and have applied over and over ever since, is the tech
nique of sharpening the conflict, of building up the extremes,
trying to make sure that their extreme grows faster than the
opposite extreme, trying to deny the capacity or right of any
middle group to survive. This is a technique which they applied
within Russia by saying that it was a choice between the Soviet
regime or a return of police rule, landlord control of the peasants,
control by the factory owners, in the old autocratic way. On that
basis the Bolsheviks secured active support by a militant min
ority and passive tolerance of their rule by a great majority of
the people.
At the same time of course, another technique which they
used and have used over and over again is to promise those things
which will bring immediate support even though they later reverse
their pledges. In 1918 they were saying to the peasants, "We have
given you the land. You have got the land, and the Soviet re
gime is the only one that can guarantee that you will keep it."
Then from 1929 to 1933 they took away the land again through
collectivization. For them no political agreement is permanent,
provided they can violate it to their own advantage and without
risk of defeat. That was another technique which they developed
very rapidly at that time and have used ever since.
A second crisis came from 1929 to 1937 in the field of in
dustrialization. The Soviet government embarked upon a very
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wide-scale industrialization. I have no time to go into details of

that but it meant more than doubling industrial population and
increasing industrial output roughly three times over in a very
short period of years. Along with this was the question of the
control over the peasantry. During these same years of indus

trialization, the government was engaged, from '29 to '33 in a

bitter war against the peasantry in which the peasants were forc

ed into the collective farm system.

Over five million peasants

were removed from their homes and sent into forced labor as
"Kulaks". The name was applied i1;1 a very loose scale. Anyone

who did not like collectivization could be put under that rubric
and eliminated. This was a tremendous struggle. There were
many thousands of casualties among the government as well as
millions of casualties among their opponents, whether actual or

potential.

Finally after 1941 the Soviet government was involved in

the greatest war in history, fighting on its own soil, using a
large part of its industrial and agricultural areas, and suffering

great hardship and great losses of manpower. In the latter stages
of the war it recovered all its territory and expanded its control

over a large number of its neighboring peoples. In every case,

except that of Yugoslavia, it first secured military dominance in

the area. Then it established political control through the local
Communist parties and then through political and economic con

trol, it has pulled its satellites closer and closer to the Soviet

pattern.

What are the factors which we have to watch in estimating
Soviet strength and weakness? One factor is the complete cen
tralization of control, exercised by a very small group at the top.

This creates both strength and weakness. It has the strength
to direct resources, skilled manpower, including administrators,
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where it is most needed. I remember in 1943, during the period

of the Moscow conference, I was complaining to one of the Soviet

negotiators about the great slowness of replies to requests or

proposals that had to be sent to Moscow, under the Soviet system

of centralizing even minor decisions there. He said, "Mr. Molotov

is busy building tanks all day until 11 :00 at night and he deals

with foreign policy after 11 :00 at night. So that only a limited
number of problems can be brought before him at any one time."

This high degree of centralization means that they can bring pol

icy and strength to bear rapidly and with complete absence of

responsibility to anyone outside a small group. On the other hand,

it means that they face difficulties of control down the line. People

further down the line report those things which will make it safe

for them in order to avoid punishment and keep safe. It is like the

old story or three banks in a small town, which moved the cash

reserve from one bank to another just in time for it to be counted
by the inspector.

Soviet administrators have to survive.

To do

that they often have to deceive their own leaders in spite of the

great risk which that brings. Then there is the inefficiency of

over-centralization, but I haven't time to go into that detail.

The basic concept of Soviet control is found in the party

line. At any given time there is a certain interpretation, a certain
pressure toward a goal which is set from above. At a later time,

that rriay shift to a somewhat different emphasis. It is only by a

very careful study of slogans, editorials, speeches, that one can

foreshadow the shifts which are about to occur or, in many cases,

have already occured, only to be made public after being tried out
in secret first. Every member of the administration is required
to know the line.

One of the things which has been striking

in negotiating with the Russians is that something which happens,

let us say in Indonesia, may affect something that is going on in

Austria, where it is all closely tied in. A shift sometimes occurs
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in a Soviet position by negotiating, and it isn't until afterwards
that you can figure out that it is in response to something that has
happened anywhere else in another theatre. We tend to decen
tralize our problems and view each one on its merits. That is one
of our difficulties in dealing with the Russians, because they are
always trying fo deal with it as a whole.
The "line" then is the ideological guide thrown out at any
given time. There are three main channels thr<;mgh which the
line is given at a time. One is through public statements, and
those statements often follow -experiments with initiating a new
line. The second .is through instructions given in party meetings
by a system of party controls. Here the instructions are passed on
to party members only at meetings. And the third channel is a
system of circulating secret information and secret directives
only to a top group which is estimated to run to about 3,000 people
in Moscow and in the provinces.
The Russians themselves have had many jokes about the
party line and the way it frequently shifts, changing its emphasis
from the left to the right foot, so to speak, The ability to be with
the "line" and to change with it is very important in the survival
of Soviet administrators and leaders of all ranks.
The second factor of strength and weakness is in the forced
industrialization which has been carried on throughout the 1930's
and has been renewed with even greater ruthlessness since the
war. (I haven't time to go into the det1:1.ils, Dr. Shimkin will want
to take . that up). But I want to point out that this has created
great strength. After all, the Soviet Union was able, in spite of the
loss of so much of its industrial territory, to produce its own tanks,
most of its own planes, and a large amount of its other equipment
during the war. It has certainly hung on to that equipment as
well as a great amount of captured equipment, and has gone on
32
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producing since the war on a considerable scale, although of course
not in the same p:r-oportion as during the war, as far as we can
judge.

There are many bottlenecks in the Soviet industrial· system.

It is like any wartime economy which is operating in full capacity,

a shortage develops here in some specialized tool or some gauge,
and production suffers. It requires great effort to assure a flow of
raw materials, equipment and skilled manpower. The Soviet econ
omy since 1928 has never had the sort of "gravy" which our
economy has and which in 1939 to 1941 facilitated so greatly the
transfer to wartime production. They are always operating right
up to capacity. They have <many breakdowns and losses because

of that. They have not even approached the smooth, continuous
operation which we consider essential to efficient operation.

Another factor is that this industrialization has been paid

for right out of the blood and marrow of the people. The basic

device by which it is paid for is the turn-over tax or sales tax. It

seems incredible but the Russians pay a tax of

!800% on bread,

300% on eggs, 400% on sugar and corresponding sales taxes. Rough

ly the industrial inve�tment of the government corresponds to the
income from the sales tax plus income from sales under govern

ment monoplies like salt, liquor, matches and tobacco. So the people

themselves are paying higher prices due to these high taxes for

industrialization.

A third factor is that the main emphasis has been given

to heavy industry, production of war material and machine tools.

If you take a factor like steel for example, which rose from 6,000,000 metric tons in 1928 to 10,000,000 in 1932, 18,000,000 tons in

1940, and it is expected to reach 25,000,000 tons in 1950 and you

compare that with cotton textiles, basic to ·the livelihood of the

people, the output of cotton goods planned for 1950 is the same as

RESTRICTED
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950

33
21

Naval War College Review, Vol. 3 [1950], No. 10, Art. 3

RESTRICTED
that achieved in 1932. Meanwhile the area and population of the

country have grown greatly. Civilian equipment was not replen

ished at all during the war. Since .the war it has been replenished

at a very low rate. In other words, the whole emphasis is on heavy
industry and this leads to great strain.

One of the main problems is the problem of discipline of

labor. Labor is restless. The government has tried an kinds of
devices. A worker who leaves his job without permission can be

sentenced to three months in prison or six months work in his
factory, paying 25% of his wages, small as they are, as a fine. A

person who comes more than 20 minutes late for work three

times over a period of time can be sentenced to continue to work

at his job, deducting 25% from his wages. That sort of thing has

not been tolerated for 100 years by American labor. Similar things

occured in many countries at the very beginning of the industrial

revolution. The problem of low standard of living in Russia which
is the basic factor in labor unrest, cannot be solved as long as the

government insists upon devoting primary effort to heavy industry
and war material.

The agricultural basis is weak. The collective farm system

has achieved its political purpose.

It has given the government

control over the disposition of the crops, and it is effective in that

way. It has led to some increase in the area of cultivation, much

of it in sub-marginal land which should not have been brought
under cultivation.

It definitely has not raised the standard of

living of the peasants. In fact, I believe it has lowered it some

what, even compared with 1913.

Soviet agriculture under its

present system does not produce abundance of food and agricul
tural raw materials. During the war, despite the large reserves
which were believed to have been accumulated, the Soviet Union

had to depend in large part, on lend-lease food in order to supply
critical elements in the armed forces and industry.
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The nationality problem is another strength and yet weak
ness. The Soviet government has proclaimed the policy of devel. oping cultures which are "national in form and socialist in content",
- in other words, "Soviet" in content. The word "socialist" should
not be given to the Soviet system, in my opinion, but should be
reserved for the democratic Socialism of the West.
This development of the nationalities has, however, under
gone a number of important shifts. After a period in the 1920's
when the emphasis was .on favoring the non-Russian nationalities
and upon stimulating the development of their cultures, by .the mid1930's the shift came back to Russian culture. Emphasis was
placed on Russian as a common language of the whole country,
as well as of the armed forces, and as the language of the "leading"
nationality within the Soviet state. In 1945, two weeks after V-E
Day, Stalin made a speciaf toast, saying, "I want to drink to the
Russian people",-:-- and he emphasized the word "Russian," "which
has borne the main burden of the war."
There has been a very sharp shift back toward emphasis
on the primacy of Russian culture and language. For instance
in Georgia or Azerbaijan, a worker can become a foreman in a
factory, studying in his own language, Georgian or Azerbaijanian
Turkish. But if he wants to become an engineer, he must learn
Russian and must learn it well, in order to be able to absorb the
education and in order to compete with Russian-speaking fellow
students for a chance at advanced training.
At the end of the war there were large groups of non
Russian Soviet people who refused to return to the Soviet Union.
Many of them were returned by force. Among these groups were
many Ukrainians, as well as people of other non-Russian groups.
There were other peoples, of course, not to mention the intelligent
sia of the Baltic States, which was quite unreconciled to being
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under Soviet rule. It is clear that the Soviet promotion of the
national languages and cultures, even under the sever:e limitation

of conformity to Soviet ideas, has started a long train of evolution
which may extend way beyond our times. Whether it will result

in the development of a genuine federation of nationalities or

whether the repulsion of the separate nationalities against Soviet
rule will lead them at a critical moment to break away from Russia
is a question which will require very careful study.
The Soviet Union develops cultural isolation and cultural

autarchy as a means of emphasizing the deep separation of the

Soviet from the non-Soviet world. This has certain weaknesses

too. In the technical field they are very active, as we know, to our
very great disadvantage, in securing every kind of information.
In this country they are free to buy copies of every patent and

copies of every technical magazine, while Soviet periodicals of
the same type are now forbidden to be exported.
In the few remaining minutes I have only one or two more
matters which I can call to your attention. One of these is the ques
tion whether the Soviet revolution was a ;Russian revolution or_
a world-wide revolution? The revolution came about in Russia
because of many peculiar conditions, not duplicated exactly any

where else, either in Europe or in Asia. There are many writers
on the Soviet revolution who maintain that it was a "Russian"
revolution. However, the Soviet leaders have always insisted that
it was the beginning of a world-wide revolution. As soon as they
were able they established a Communist international. When
that was abolished in 1943, they had available considerable cadres
of trained Communists, many of them with experience in Soviet
administration, including both the intelligence and secret police
systems and were able to operate through them and without the out
ward form of a universal or world-wide communist organization.
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Even in 1928 when Stalin was hopeful of getting loans
abroad and trying in every way to get foreign help, he stressed
that the purpose of industrialization was to strengthen the Soviet
Union so that it could fulfill its duty to assisting the triumph of
Communism throughout the world.
The Soviet leaders assume that conflict between the Soviet
and non-Soviet worlds is inevitable and continuous. But whether
this conflict will take the form of a war-to-the death is left open.
The Soviet leaders maneuver so that they can push hard in some
sectors and play it soft in others, whereas we are inclined to be
soft all over or hard all over. They do this in part, so that it
cannot be said at any given time that they want to have an all-out
conflict. We need to learn that. Apparently we have been either
too soft with them, as I felt was the case during the war, or we
are hard all along the line. Perhaps it would be more confusing
to an antagonist if we would vary our own tactics more.
Another factor which is very important in a revolutionary
technique is the combination of military and political factors,
using one and then the other, and using military predominance
to get control of political power by skillful use of each.
In the Soviet view of the world, the whole question of
"getting along", of sitting down together, is quite irrelevant.
Conflict is basic to life. They take a strictly material point of view
and apply it to social and political life. They do not believe one
can put conflict out of the way by simply agreeing to do so. And
when people in our country say we should sit down and have a
general settlement, or when Mr. Churchill, to my amazement, says
we should "sit down" with Stalin and just settle things, they are
unrealistic. Actually, because the Soviet leaders· believe that con
flict is inevitable, they are very much disappointed when some
thing is given to them without having to struggle for it. I thought
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after Yalta that the Russians were disappointed that the Far

Eastern concessions were given to them without argument and
without struggle. They must have gone away with the feeling
that they might have gotten even more, and they probably blamed

themselves for not having asked for even more. The psychology
of making even a friendly concession in the expectation that good
will will be created doesn't work out with them. I do riot know
any time in our dealings with the Soviet Union when it has worked
out.

We must learn to deal with the Soviet leadership on its own
terms of reference, accepting, for practical purposes, the idea
that conflict with our world is inherent in the whole nature of

things. We have to conduct our part of that conflict in a much
more effective and coordinated way than we have done. At any
given time, it does not mean that the Soviet government has deter
mined that war is inevitable. They have written a good deal since

the war about "socialist encirclement" of capitalism, rather than
"capitalist encirclement" of the Soviet State. The Soviet leaders
will try to go on to encircle the democratic world, which they prefer
to call the capitalist world. Our problem is to cope with that prob
ably rather than a direct frontal attack.
In their reasoning about the nature of the conflict, th,�
Soviet leaders differ in at least one respect from Hitler. Hitler

felt time was working against him; that if he did not establish
control of Europe within a lmited time, it would be too late. The
growth of Russia, the continued strength of the British Common
wealth, and so on, would make his aim impossible of achievement
at a later time. Hitler had a rather tight time-schedule. I believe

the Soviet leaders accept war as a distinct possibility, perhaps
in the long run, a certainty. They would not hesistate to use it
if they thought it would be effective in securing their aims. On

the other hand I think they do not, from their own philosophy, feel
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the immediate urge to use it within a limited time. From their
point of view, the forces of dissolution of capitalism, especially in
the colonial world, would be more effective than an early war in
spreading the Soviet system, and, if given more time would per
haps work out to the Soviet goal without the losses and risks of a
major war.
At any given time Soviet policy is based upon maximum
and minimum aims. Those aims have to be watched whether we
are looking at Asia, Europe, the Middle East or Africa.
That brings us to the three ways of trying to deal with
Russia. Should we try to defeat Russia outright in the hope that
that would simplify our problems? I think that fighting people
generally feel that even a short war of that kind is much more
costly in social, political and material ways than a long period of
preparation for war in the hope of avoiding it, but of course I
can't speak for that.
The second way is by appeasement. I have altilady said that,
from my own experience of spending some 2,000 hours negotiating
with the Russians, as well as observing and discussing other nego
tiations, it is sometimes possible to work out individual adjust
ments here and there, but not to settle any of the major problems
permanently. They always reappear because in the Soviet view
each problem represents a contest for power. It goes on. Even
though one side may wish it would not go on, it cannot be wished
out of existence.
The other is the policy of containment. I believe that con
tainment, intelligently and effectively applied, is our only hope.
I am very glad that we are beginning to raise our military power,
-our armed power in the broad sense, -to something approach
ing the level of the political commitments that we have undertaken
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since the war. I believe that containment alone is not enough,
that there are elements of weakness within the Soviet regime or
Soviet orbit which we should play upon to the maximum, by skill
ful psychological warfare, which, however, must be backed by a
really well-thought-out political party.
It is possible that the Soviet regime will settle down and
become more "livable with." We must remember that the Soviet
regime is not very "livable with," even for the Soviet people. Dur
ing the war, Soviet citizens tol.d me quite frequently that they
hoped things would be better after the war, that there would be
a material improvement because of greater emphasis upon raising
the standard of living rather than keeping it at a bare minimum
for most of the people, so that there would be somewhat greater
freedom for the individual even within an over-all political dicta
torship. Even under an absolutism it is possible to have some
freedom of discussion. It is not necessary to have a single official
line in everything, including linguistics, (you may have noticed
that Marshall Stalin has recently laid down the line even _in lin
guistics, in which he is surely not an expert).
Now as one Soviet official of fairly high rank, and speaking
in Russian and in confidence, said to me toward the end of the war,
or rather before the shift which came in November 1944 toward a
stiffened Soviet line towards the West, "Before the war the regime
did not trust the people; now the people have saved the regime and
the regime has got to trust the people." These hopes were shattered
by the new tightening up which began in late 1944 and has contin
ued since the war. Briefly, there was a reversion to emphasis upon
dictatorship of the party in place of the wartime appeal to broadly
patriotic and national sentiments. In foreign policy that shift was
paralleled by the stiffening of the line, the gradual placing of the
United States in the place formerly occupied by Hitler in the
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Soviet concept, and by the renewed drive to capture all our "good"
slogans of "Freedom - Democracy - Opportunity" and to claim
those as Soviet monopolies.
The Soviet regime can, presumably become a "livable" · re
gime. The rank-and-file of its officials live under a great strain,
and a mis-step may lead to elimination and destruction of them
selves and their families. If there should be a settling down in the
Soviet regime, it would come through establishing clear lines of
authority, so that an official, whether civilian or :military, will
know whether he is wrong or not, and what he is supposed to do.
At present, he may be punished for something he did not do or
punished for something that he thought he was not supposed to
do, a very complicated system to live under. A process of settling
down might lead from that to a system of defining a clearer
status for the different groups of people. It would lead to a better
standard of living, a lessened emphasis on capital goods industries
and military industries.
I emphasize that at present I See no signs of such an evolu
tion in the Soviet regime. I merely mention these possible lines
of development which we should be alert to detect. If signs of an
internal "settling down" should begin to appear, as a result of
the postponement to an indefinite future of the desire to conquer
Western Europe and to conquer the rest of Asia, it would be the
most helpful sign in a long time of the Soviet leadership accepting
limitations on their role and on their power. Such an evolution
would make other peoples feel that the Soviet leaders were begin
ning to practice what they preach when they assert that different
systems can co-exist in the same world.
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